Community Grievance Decision Digest
TREATMENT - SECOND OPINIONS, RIGHT TO
THE LAW:
"Any
patient who does not agree with
all or any part of his or her treatment plan shall be permitted a second
consultation for review of the treatment plan as follows:
(a)
An involuntary patient
may request a second consultation from another staff member who is not
directly providing treatment to the patient, and the treatment
facility shall make the designated staff member available at no charge to the patient; and
(b)
Any patient
may, at his or her own expense,
arrange for a second consultation from a
person who is not employed by
the treatment facility to
review the patient's treatment record.
(c)
Service providers
may pay for some or all of the
costs of any second consultation allowed under sub. (b).
Service providers may also enter into
agreements with other service
providers to furnish consultations for each other’s clients.”
HFS 94.09(3),
Wis. Admin. Code [Emphasis added.]
"Each
inpatient and residential treatment
facility that administers medications shall have a peer review committee or other medical oversight mechanism reporting
to the facility's governing body
to ensure proper utilization of medications."
HFS 94.09(9), Wis. Admin. Code [Emphasis added.]
DECISIONS:
-
A
client received services from an agency contracted
by the county. He felt
that the provider releasing information, without his consent, to an
evaluator who was completing a vocational
assessment violated his confidentiality.
The evaluator was from a local university who had no official
connection to the county’s service delivery system.
However, by mutual agreement all the parties, including the
client, he was to do a comprehensive vocational evaluation of the
client. At a later meeting with the parties, the client found out that
county staff had shared specific information about his mental health
history but had not obtained a release from him to do so. Other
“consents to disclose confidential information” were on file, but
there was no release of information relative to the staff’s
involvement in the evaluation process.
Was the verbal sharing of any information with the evaluator
permissible? Any
information about the client’s mental health history and treatment
would constitute “treatment record” information within the meaning
of confidentiality laws. But the staff’s very presence at the
meeting was an identification of sorts that the client was receiving
services from the county. Did
the presence of the staff at the meeting and the client’s lack of
objection at the time to any information shared provide an implied
consent on his part? Was any information shared covered by some other
exception to the requirement for an informed written consent? It was
concluded that this evaluation was akin
to a “second consultation”
and not provided as a routine “purchase of service” resource for
county staff. Thus, it did
not readily fit into one of the exceptions to the confidentiality law
wherein there is a pre-existing purchase of services contract between
the county and a provider. Further,
the section of HFS 94 that addresses a “second consultation” notes
that the person doing the consultation can review the client’s
treatment record. By the
staff member’s un-objected-to presence, the client may have provided
an implied consent, but
that this was a “close call” in terms of the technical
confidentiality requirements. Since the vocational evaluation was set
up by mutual agreement of all parties, there likely was an expectation
of open sharing of treatment information to assist the evaluation
process. Nonetheless, it would have been best for the service
providers to have a clearly
written release of information from the client that would specify
who all could be part of the information sharing process. There was
insufficient evidence to find a rights violation. When outside
evaluations occur, there should be clear
documentation of the evaluator’s
legal status in terms of that person’s right to access treatment
information. For example,
is it being done under a purchase of services agreement, as a second
opinion/ consultation, or via a specific release of information that
clarifies who can provide treatment information, and what type, to the
evaluator. (Level III decision in Case No. 00-SGE-01 on 6/29/01.)
-
In
general, the treatment decisions of professionals are afforded “due
deference” by peers and by the courts.
However, if a treatment decision “departs
from professional judgment”, the patient’s right to treatment
may have been violated. A
second opinion is usually necessary to see if a professional exercised
his or her judgment in a professional manner. A “departure from
professional judgment” may be evinced in any of three ways:
a) where the evidence suggests that the professional exercised no
judgment at all; b) where the individual
was not qualified to make the judgment; or c) where a decision was
made on an impermissible basis
(e.g., as “punishment”). (Level IV decision in Case No. 02-SGE-04
on 9/19/03.)
-
There
must be sufficient evidence to show it was more probable than not that a doctor
departed from professional judgment in his prescribing medication
to a patient after a phone call with her.
Such evidence would have to come in the form of a second opinion from a professional of equal or greater standing than
the doctor. Where there was no
such evidence presented during the Level III review, the finding of a rights violation
will be overturned. (Level
IV decision in Case No. 02-SGE-04 on 9/19/03, overturning the Level
III.)
-
An outpatient client disagreed with her
therapist assigning her an Axis II Borderline Personality Disorder diagnosis.
A diagnosis is
ultimately a professional
opinion and given “due
deference”. The client had the right to obtain a second opinion
from a different therapist. (Level III Grievance Decision in
Case No. 05-SGE-12 on 5/16/06)
-
A
complainant had the opportunity to challenge the diagnosis reached by
an independent outpatient clinician in the ongoing legal proceedings
where that diagnosis was presented in court.
She could have obtained
a second opinion from a different psychologist and presented that
as a rebuttal.
The diagnosis was
the clinician’s opinion,
which cannot be challenged
in the grievance process.
(Level IV decision in Case No. 06-SGE-09 on 9/27/06)
Last Updated: November 13, 2006 |